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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1996, California deregulated its energy industry, thereby placing the
generation and sale of electric power in the hands of private parties.' By doing so,

1.

SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 6X, at 4 (Apr. 26, 2001).
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the State sought to foster a competitive market for the purchase of electricity.2
California's objective in opening its power industry to competition was to
provide a benefit throughout the economy.' Ultimately, the State hoped that the
resulting competition would cause power companies to lower the cost of
electricity statewide. Once completed, the deregulation of California's power
industry was intended to place the State's energy market in the6 same class as
other utilities,' with the desired result of lowering consumer costs.

Unfortunately, deregulation did not go as planned. Instead, California found
itself facing a severe shortage of power.7 This lack of resources forced the State
to purchase large amounts of electricity from other states, typically at grossly
inflated rates.8 Consequently, California endured "skyrocketing wholesale
electricity prices, an electric system with suspect reliability.... and bondholders
who have seen their investments plummet." 9
In response to this energy crisis, the Legislature enacted Chapter 10,'° which
creates a public power authority responsible for providing the State with
additional power to augment its dwindling supply." Chapter 10 is intended to
create a new agency whose duty is to build new power plants for California '2 in
order to provide the state with a sufficient amount of power at reasonable rates."

2. See Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Denial of Regulatory Assistance in Stranded Cost Recovery in a
Deregulated Electricity Industry, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 431, 437 (1999) (expressing hope that "broader
additional benefits will be reaped by deregulating the electricity generation market and opening the market to
competition.").
3. Id.
4. See id. (citing New York as an example of another state that hoped to provide its citizens with
electricity at lowered rates, as a result of deregulation).
5. See Colin Drukker, Economic Consequences of Electricity Deregulation:A Case Study of San Diego
Gas & Electric in a Deregulated Electricity Market, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 291, 292 (stating that "[dieregulation
is affecting many industries worldwide, such as telecommunications, airlines, trucking, and electricity.").
6. See Nowicki, supra note 2, at 437 (explaining that the objective of deregulating the power industry is
to reduce energy prices).
7. See SENATE RULES COMMIrrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 6X, at 4 (Apr. 26, 2001) (describing the
"classic market failure" resulting from deregulation of the power industry and the accompanying energy
shortage in California).
8. See Robert Salladay & Lynda Gledhill, Energy Bill Approved by Senate; It Would Create Power
Board That Could Build New Plants, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 21, 2001, at A4 (observing that states such as Texas
and North Carolina have been selling power to California at unreasonably high prices as a result of California's
power shortage).
9. SENATE RULES COMMrrrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 6X, at 4 (Apr. 26, 2001).
10. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3300 (enacted by Chapter 10) (creating the California Consumer
Power and Conservation Financing Authority Act, with the intent to create more available energy for
California).
11. Id.
12. See id. § 3341.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 10) (allowing the Authority to "construct or improve"
electricity generating facilities).
13. Id. § 3300 (enacted by Chapter 10).
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Many feel that Chapter 10 is an effective method of lowering energy costs in
California and will give the State the electricity it needs.' 4 However, Chapter 10
raises suspicions as to whether it will be able to achieve the goals outlined by the
Legislature. 5

II.

EXISTING LAW

A. The Public Utilities Commission
Currently, California law places the regulation of the State's electricity
supply largely under the control of the California Public Utilities Commission
(PUC). 6 The Legislature granted the PUC 7 power to impose regulations upon all
state public utilities in any method needed, in a manner that is easiest for it under
the circumstances.
Such public utilities are defined in the California
Constitution as private entities, including corporations and individuals, that own
or in any way operate plants and other systems pertaining to management of
electricity and other public necessities.' 9
However, power companies owned and operated by public entities, 20 such as
city or state governments, are not subject to the PUC's standards of regulation
and are free to regulate their facilities as they see fit.2' This deprives the State of
the ability to regulate certain power generators." Private entities, on the other
hand, are subject to the PUC's regulations regarding operation of their facilities,
including the rates they charge 3 Under section 728 of the California Public

14. See, e.g., Lynda Gledhill & Greg Lucas, Bill to Let State Build GeneratorsGets an OK; New Power
Authority Would Govern Plants, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 27, 2001, at A21 (presenting the opinion of
Assemblymember Robert Hertzberg, who believes that Chapter 10 will help California acquire the energy it
requires and abate the energy crisis).
15. See infra Part IV.B (analyzing potential flaws in the construction of Chapter 10 and the possible
accompanying consequences of its implementation).
16. See CAL. CONST. art. XII (governing the regulation of public utilities).
17. See id. § I (explaining that the PUC consists of five members appointed by the Governor and subject
to the Senate's approval).
18. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 1975) (stating that the PUC has the authority to "supervise
and regulate every public utility in the state and may do all things.., which are necessary and convenient in the
exercise of such power and jurisdiction.").
19. See CAL. CONST. art. XI1, § 3 (citing the following examples of entities under the control of the
PUC: power-generating facilities, telephone transmission services, and public transportation systems).
20. See Am. Microsystems, Inc. v. Santa Clara, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 1042-43, 187 Cal. Rptr. 550,
554 (1982) (limiting the definition of "public utility" for purposes of the PUC's regulatory power to encompass
only facilities operated by private individuals and companies and not facilities operated by city, county, or state
agencies).
21. See id. (holding that distributors of electricity owned by public entities are not subject to regulation
by the Public Utilities Commission absent legislation to the contrary; therefore, they are not required to pass
cost savings to their customers).
22. Id.
23. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. Code § 728 (West 1975) (stating that the PUC, upon holding a hearing, shall
determine rates that it considers fair if it finds that a privately owned power-generating facility has imposed
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Utilities Code, if the PUC finds that the rates a 'public utility charges are
unreasonably high,24 the PUC may hold a hearing. 5 During these hearings, the
PUC may determine a satisfactory rate to be charged to the public.2 6
In light of the above standards imposed by California law, the Legislature
gave the PUC the authority to regulate public utilities, as specified in the
California Constitution,27 in any manner necessary.2" This includes the power to
set rates for just compensation in cases of property taken by using the State's
power of eminent domain.29 Compensation awarded to the prior owner is
typically the value of the property taken plus the damages to the remainder, if
any, minus any benefits conferred by the taking. ° Current law applies to the PUC
in eminent domain proceedings and does not affect its authority to exercise its
power in such situations.3' This allows the PUC to acquire the property necessary
to perform its regulatory duties when no other means are available to do so, such
as when a private company refuses to comply with rates imposed by the PUC, or
when the land needed to 32
build a new power plant is owned by a private citizen
who is unwilling to sell it.
B. The Energy Commission
In addition to the authority and duties of the PUC, California also
implemented the Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources and Development
Act,33 which creates and sets guidelines for the activities of the California Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission (Energy Commission).34
The purpose of the Energy Commission was to assist the State in providing the
general public with an adequate supply of electricity, in an amount sufficient to

rates that are not reasonable).
24. See S.Cal. Edison Co., No. 52336, 1971 Cal. PUC LEXIS 759, at *56, 72 CPUC 282 (on file with
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that reasonable rates for public utilities are determined by weighing such
factors as standard costs, rates charged by competing facilities, how the gained revenue is used, and overall
advantage to consumers).
25. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 728.
26. See S.Cal. Edison Co., No. 52336, 1971 Cal. PUC LEXIS at *56 (discussing factors used by the
PUC to decide rates).
27. See CAL. CONST. art. Xn, § 3 (stating that private entities in the business of operating electricitygenerating facilities are "public utilities" subject to regulation by the PUC).
28. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 1975) (delegating legislative regulatory power to the PUC).
29. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.010, 1240.030 (West 1982) (dictating
that eminent domain, the government's power to take the property of another, can be exercised when the
property will be put to public use in instances of public necessity).
30. Id. § 1263.410 (West 1982).
31. Id. § 1230.060 (West 1982).
32. See id. §§ 1240.010, 1240.030 (West 1982) (allowing government agencies to take the property of
private individuals when necessary to promote the welfare of the public).
33. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25000 (West 1996) (implementing the Warren-Alquist Energy
Resources and Development Act).
34. Id. § 25000 et seq. (West 1996 & Supp. 2002).
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satisfy the demands and needs of the public.35 As such, the State declared that the
level of energy produced was "consistent with the need for such energy for
protection of public health and safety, for promotion of the general welfare, and
for environmental quality protection. '36
The Energy Commission was authorized to secure this electricity in a number
of ways, such as by conducting studies of current and future availability of and
demand for electricity37 and similar trends regarding fossil fuels." However, the
duty of the Energy Commission most relevant to public utilities is its certification
jurisdiction. 9 This power gave the Energy Commission the authority to ensure
that all electricity-producing facilities in California comply with its standards of
production. 0 The result was that no electrical plants of any kind may be
constructed or altered without first being certified by the Energy Commission 41n
a manner consistent with its standards. 2 All standards for the construction and
operation of energy facilities are set by the Energy Commission, subject to
changes suggested by the local, regional, and state governments. 3
Ill. CHAPTER 10
In an attempt to augment California's waning power supply and to aid in the
conservation of electricity," the Legislature enacted Chapter 10, thereby creating

35.

See id. § 25001 (West 1996) (stating that:
[E]lectrical energy is essential to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this
state.., and that it is the responsibility of the government to ensure that a reliable supply
of electrical energy is maintained at a level consistent with the need for such energy for
protection of public health and safety, for promotion of the general welfare, and for
environmental quality protection.).
36. Id.
37. See id. § 25309 (West Supp. 2002) (requiring the Energy Commission to provide the Governor and
the Legislature with a report concerning California's energy requirements for the next twenty years, as well as
availability of power for that period, based on the amount the state develops in that time).
38. See id. § 25310 (West Supp. 2002) (providing guidelines for the Energy Commission's report to the
Governor and the Legislature regarding long range estimates of fuel availability and need, as well as any
changes in current procedure that the Commission may recommend).
39. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25500 (West 1996) (governing the Energy Commission's regulatory
power over electricity-generating facilities).
40. See id. (asserting that "no construction of any facility or modification of any existing facility shall be
commenced without first obtaining certification for any such site and related facilities by the commission.").
41. See id. (mandating that electricity-generating facilities can only be constructed or altered if the
project is certified by the Energy Commission).
42. See id. § 25525 (West Supp. 2002) (setting certification standards for the Energy Commission by
requiring it to consider such factors as the facility's compliance with state or local laws, its environmental
effect, advantages the facility confers on the public, and whether or not the facility is a reliable source of
energy).
43. See id. § 25216.3 (West 1996) (stating that certification requirements regarding electrical plants are
to be devised by the Commission, except that government agencies may propose changes to those standards in
order to comply with new laws).
44. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3300 (enacted by Chapter 10).
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the California Consumer Power and Conservation Financing Authority Act (the
Authority). 5 Chapter 10 creates an agency modeled after the New York Power
Authority (NYPA),46 which is authorized to construct electricity storage and
generating facilities for the purpose of aiding the state of New York in obtaining
its needed power supply. 7 The NYPA has constructed ten power generating
plants that currently provide New York with one-fourth of its electric power,
providing much-needed electricity to the state. 8 Chapter 10 purports to make a
similar contribution to California's power crisis by providing additional power in
an effort to alleviate the State's lack of electricity.' 9
A. Powers Vested In the Authority
To achieve the goals of Chapter 10, ° the Legislature empowered the
Authority to create its own regulations in the course of conducting its business'
and to "do all things necessary and convenient" in the exercise of its authority.
This is similar to the power given to the PUC.5 3 Specifically, Chapter 10
authorizes the Authority to purchase and improve existing generators, enter into
contracts with independent parties to construct new generators, provide loans in
conjunction with construction and improvement of generation facilities and
conservation projects, acquire land for the purpose of constructing new facilities,
and any other activity it deems necessary to aid in the construction or
improvement of generation facilities and energy conservation projects 4 These
powers are combined with the Energy Commission's authority to certify new
facilities, requiring certification of any site purchased or otherwise acquired by
the activities of the Authority.
However, purchases and loans are not the only methods the Authority has at
its disposal to construct new power plants. 6 Chapter 10 also empowers the

45. Id. § 3320 (enacted by Chapter 10).
46. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 6X, at 5 (Apr. 26, 2001) (commenting
that Chapter 10 was modeled after the NYPA in an attempt to emulate that Authority's success in expanding
energy generation, which helps to provide auxiliary power for such public agencies as hospitals and police
stations).
47. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1005 (McKinney 1994 & Supp. 2002).
48. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 6X, at 5-6 (Apr. 26, 2001).
49. See id. at 5 (describing the agencies' responsibilities and powers).
50. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the Legislature's motive for drafting Chapter 10).
51. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3340(f) (enacted by Chapter 10).
52. Id. § 701 (West 1975).
53. See id. (giving the PUC the power to regulate public utilities, so that it may perform its duties as
efficiently as possible).
54. Id. §§ 3340-3341.2 (enacted by Chapter 10).
55. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25500 (West 1996) (authorizing the Energy Commission to require
certification of construction or alteration of any electrical facilities in the state before any building or
modification takes place).
56. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3341 (enacted by Chapter 10) (outlining the powers of the Authority).
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Authority to exercise eminent domain to acquire suitable land for new facilities. 7
Although the Authority may not exercise eminent domain over the land of the

State without its consent, this empowerment nevertheless acts as an expansion
of the eminent domain power available to the PUC.5 9 Although the PUC only has
the power to regulate public utilities owned by private entities, 60 Chapter 10
grants additional power to the Authority, allowing it to "construct or improve any
enterprise," public or private, thus making it possible to regulate all generation
facilities in the State.6
B. Administration of the Authority
A board of directors, similar to that governing the PUC, administers the
Authority." The Authority's board of directors consists of five members,
including the State Treasurer and four other individuals selected by the
Governor. 63 The members of this board, who will initially serve progressively
smaller terms and thereafter serve for four years, 6 will hold meetings and vote on
all issues pertinent to the activities of the Authority, with a supporting vote of
three members being required for any issue to receive the support of the
Authority.6 5 The board's meetings will be open to the public 66 and are a matter of
public record.67

57. Id. §§ 3340(d), 3341.1(a) (enacted. by Chapter 10).
58. See id. § 3341.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 10) (allowing the Authority to obtain property in order to
build or augment power facilities "[bly gift, lease, purchase, eminent domain, or otherwise .... except that no
property of a state public body may be acquired without its consent.").
59. See CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 5 (granting the PUC the ability to set rates of just compensation for the
property it takes through its power of eminent domain).
60. See id. § 3 (defining "public utilities" under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission as
systems, including power facilities, owned or operated by private corporations or individuals).
61. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3341.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 10) (allowing the Authority to build and
modify generation facilities and obtain the property necessary to do so via eminent domain, financial
transactions, or through other methods, although such acquisitions are subject to the State's consent in the case
of property owned by public entities).
62. See CAL. CONST. art. XII, § I (explaining the composition and mechanics of the board of directors
governing the PUC).
63. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3325(a) (enacted by Chapter 10) (articulating that such appointees
must be extremely experienced in energy-related fields, such as electricity generation, natural gas, energy
conservation, and electricity rates).
64. See id. § 3325(b) (enacted by Chapter 10) (explaining that four members of theboard, in addition to
the State Treasurer, will be appointed to progressively shorter terms, with the first member appointed serving a
four-year term, the second serving a three-year term, the third serving a two-year term, and the fourth serving a
one-year term).
65. See id. § 3325(c) (enacted by Chapter 10) (requiring a "quorum" of three board members before the
Authority may act upon any issue before it).,
66. Id. § 3327 (enacted by Chapter 10).
67. Id. § 3328 (enacted by Chapter 10).
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C. ProgramsCreatedby Chapter 10
In keeping with Chapter 10's objective to provide the State with a supply of
affordable power consistent with its needs, 8 all projects regarding generation of
power initiated or financed by the Authority shall provide the citizens of
California with the power generated by such projects at a cost equal to the price
of the electricity that the projects produce. 69 In the event that power is generated
in excess of the State's requirements, any superfluous power may be sold to
foreign entities, provided it is sold at rates that are "just and reasonable."70 In
determining the State's needs for power generation, the Authority will consider
information compiled by the Energy Commission regarding studies of energy
trends and immediate and future needs pursuant to the Public Resources Code,7'
as well as information provided by independent collaborators."
Additionally, the Authority is empowered to issue loans to independent
parties. These loans are intended to facilitate the purchase and development of
equipment designed to provide efficient and renewable energy.74 ThisS power
is
71
consistent with Chapter 10's purpose to provide for energy conservation. Such a
program is an attempt to create affordable energy and alleviate the State's
shortage of power.76 Under this plan, all appliances purchased with one of these
loans must be certified, under the standards of the Energy Commission, 7 that the
work has been completed to install the equipment."
The Authority also requires the PUC to compile a report regarding current
and future trends of California's natural gas supply, in order to assist in obtaining
an adequate supply of natural gas for energy production, pursuant to current and

68. See id. § 3310(d) (enacted by Chapter 10) (stating Chapter 10's goal: to acquire an energy supply for
California that meets the State's requirements).
69. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3351(a) (enacted by Chapter 10).
70. Id.
71. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25309 (West Supp. 2002) (outlining technical guidelines for assessing
future energy trends and public power requirements).
72. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3350 (enacted by Chapter 10) (allowing the Authority to use studies
conducted by the Energy Commission and Independent System Operators regarding the energy supply and the
necessity of new power plant construction).
73. Id. § 3365 (enacted by Chapter 10).
74. See id. (authorizing the Authority to loan up to one billion dollars to implement programs dedicated
to conservation and renewable energy sources, such as "consumer appliances and home improvements with
electric and gas energy efficiency or renewable energy characteristics.").
75. See id. § 3310(b) (enacted by Chapter 10) (demonstrating the Legislature's desire to create
efficiency programs that will allow for renewable energy sources and the reduction of public power shortages).
76. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 6X, at 6 (Apr. 26, 2001) (stating that a
public power agency may alleviate the State's need for power and provide more cost-efficient electricity to
consumers).
77. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (outlining the certification standards of the Energy
Commission).
78. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3367 (enacted by Chapter 10) (requiring certification of all equipment
when its installation is complete).
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future requirements of the State.79 This report shall be prepared from information
obtained by the Energy Commission's assessment and studies of energy trends,
requirements and current availability of natural gas."0 The report shall be
submitted to the Authority no later than ninety days after Chapter 10's
enactment. 8'
Finally, Chapter 10 requires the Authority to collaborate with the Energy
Commission and any independent parties involved in an effort to create an
Energy Resource Investment Plan, to be returned to the Governor and the
Legislature 180 days after the enactment of Chapter 10.82 In certifying this plan,
the Authority must consider factors such as current electricity supply, sufficiency
of storage facilities, and environmental quality, in order to determine how much
electricity and natural gas will be needed by the State in the next ten years.83 The
plan must devise a strategy for reducing demand and determine what investments
would allow the Authority to attain that goal. 4
D. Funding and Bonds
In order to pay for an enormous new entity such as the Authority, Chapter 10
created the California Consumer Power and Conservation Financing Authority
Fund (the Fund), which is housed in the State Treasury.85 The Fund is designed
for the Authority to spend as it deems necessary to achieving its purposes.6 This
Fund is continuously available for expenditure on anything reasonably consistent
with the exercise of its powers under Chapter 10.7
Additionally, Chapter 10 authorizes the Authority to grant bonds to any
power facility operator, in order to provide programs and construction
endeavors . 88 These bonds may be issued in any amount, up to five billion
dollars, except in the case of renewable energy and conservation projects, which

79. Id. § 3368 (enacted by Chapter 10).
80. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25310 (West Supp. 2002) (authorizing the Energy Commission to
conduct studies regarding California's natural gas supply).
81. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3368(a) (enacted by Chapter 10).
82. Id. § 3369(a) (enacted by Chapter 10).
83. See id. § 3369(b) (enacted by Chapter 10) (mandating that the Authority balance the costs of various
fuel sources in implementing the Plan, including an assessment of the most effective strategy for reducing
public demand for energy and observing market stability of different fuel types).
84. See id. §§ 3369(c), (f) (enacted by Chapter 10) (allowing the Authority to suggest how to allocate its
finances to implement its plan and to invest its funding wherever required to ensure the plan's success).
85. Id. § 3370 (enacted by Chapter 10).
86. Id. § 3370(a) (enacted by Chapter 10).
87. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 3370(a)-(c) (enacted by Chapter 10) (implementing a continuous fund
for use by the Authority for any needed expenses incurred over the course of its activities).
88. See id. § 3370(e) (enacted by Chapter 10) (stating that the Authority may expend its finances in the
form of bonds payable from the Authority Fund).
89. Id. § 3380.1 (enacted by Chapter 10).
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are limited to one billion dollars. 9° Therefore, the bonds issued are not considered
loans but are paid from the Fund.9' No state or local governments are obligated to
repay the bonds, and the Authority gives full faith and credit to their payment. 9
Chapter 10 will terminate on January 1, 2007. 9" The Authority may not
finance any projects after the aforementioned date, absent specific Legislative
permission. 94 However, one question remains: will the Authority succeed in
solving California's energy crisis by that time?

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW LAW
Like most new laws, Chapter 10 has its supporters9" and its opponents. 96 The
Legislature designed the Authority, by its own admission, to establish programs
that will ultimately provide a sufficient amount of power to the citizens of
California.97 Thus, those in favor of the Authority argue that Chapter 10 is an
effective method of satisfying the public's demand for power. 98 Indeed, in an
atmosphere of electricity deregulation, where California's energy supply is
dwindling, 99 additional power must be generated within the State to prevent other
states from selling their power to California at unreasonably high rates. '°°
However, the creation of the Authority may not be the ideal solution. Critics
of Chapter 10 argue that a power authority, operated by the State, contradicts the

90. See id. § 3365 (enacted by Chapter 10) (limiting bond funding to one billion dollars for energy
conservation projects such as consumer and home appliances with energy efficiency characteristics).
91. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3383 (enacted by Chapter 10) (emphasizing that the state is not
responsible for repayment of any bonds issued by the Authority, as such bonds are to be taken directly from the
Fund).
92. See id. (providing that payment of any bonds issued is the sole responsibility of the Authority and
that the Authority therefore pledges to do so).
93. See id. § 3384 (enacted by Chapter 10) (requiring the Authority to achieve its objectives within five
years of the date Chapter 10 becomes effective).
94. See id. (allowing additional programs to be approved after the Authority's termination date by
enacting statutes to that effect).
95. See, e.g., Gledhill & Lucas, supra note 14, at A21 (paraphrasing Assemblymember Robert
Hertzberg, who argues that the Authority's ability to fund new generators that produce cost-based electricity
will help the state regain control over its power needs).
96. See id. (illustrating the State Republicans' virtually unanimous view that the creation of the
Authority will hinder California's ability to produce more power generators).
97. See id. § 3310(b) (enacted by Chapter 10) (outlining Chapter 10's intention to fund activities that
will help mitigate California's energy shortage).
98. See James Flanigan, State Looks to Public Power as Solution to Energy Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2001, at C1 (stating the observation of S. David Freeman, general manager of the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power, that state-operated power is the sole solution to building affordable power generators).
99. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ENERGY COSTS AND AVAILABILITY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB
6X, at 2 (Mar. 8, 2001) (observing that privatization of California's energy industry has caused problems in the
form of low energy supplies and rising energy prices).
100. See Salladay & Gledhill, supra note 8, at A4 (explaining that states such as Texas and North
Carolina are selling power to California at extremely high rates, which dramatically increases profits on such
transactions and forces California to pay unreasonable amounts of money for the power it needs).
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purpose of deregulation because it limits competition and leads California one
step closer to the socialization of its government."" Moreover, given the energy
crisis in which the State is presently immersed, Chapter 10 might simply be a
"knee-jerk" reaction to the energy crisis,' 2 and, as such, may have been enacted
simply to present the citizens of California with a short-term solution that
ultimately will not solve the energy problem.' 3 Such arguments raise serious
questions about the viability of Chapter 10 and lead one to inquire as to whether
the new Authority will do more harm than good.' 4
A. The Authority's Purpose
Chapter 10's central focus is the creation and operation of electricity
generators. '°5 Such activity is ostensibly intended to provide additional
energy to
°6
the people of California at rates that are reasonable and affordable.'
In addition to overseeing the construction of additional power plants, the
Authority ••108
will also finance programs conducted by the PUC °7 and the Energy
Commission in an attempt to provide relief from the energy shortage. °9 The
Authority is also meant to finance the improvement of old, obsolete, and
generally inferior power generators in an attempt to augment their
effectiveness. "oAccording to the drafters of Chapter 10, the ultimate objective of
these activities is to obtain a sufficient amount of energy to supply California

101. See Bill Ainsworth, Republicans Fiddle While Californians Burn, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May
27, 2001, at A3 (restating the common argument that creation of power is "socialist," which contradicts the
capitalist ideals upon which the American economy is based).
102. See Bennett Roth, Limits on Lifestyle; City Moves to Curb Undesirable Behavior, HOUS. CHRON.,
May 3, 1992, at AI (citing criticism of laws reflexively enacted in response to social problems and stating that
such laws are simply short-term solutions that ultimately will not solve the problems they address).
103. See id. (describing how many laws enacted in response to a crisis are "Band-Aids" that do not
provide a viable solution to the problem).
104. See Richard Nemec, The Power and the Irony; State Energy Mess Teems With Absurdity, DAILY
NEWS OF L.A., May 20, 2001, at V1 (questioning the effectiveness of a state-run power authority, implying that
such an entity poses many risks and may cause severe harm to the economy).
105. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3310(a) (enacted by Chapter 10) (articulating that the Authority is
intended to "[e]stablish, finance, purchase, lease, own, operate, acquire, or construct" electricity-generating
plants through any means necessary, such as through independent action of the Authority, through contractual
agreements with other entities, or through financing of others' projects to bring more power plants into being).
106. SENATE RULES COMMITrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OFSB 6X, at 5 (Apr. 26,2001).
107. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 701 (West 1975) (authorizing regulation of public utilities by the
PUC).
108. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25309 (West Supp. 2002) (outlining the Energy Commission's duties
of conducting studies in order to determine energy trends and availability).
109. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 3310(b), 3368 (enacted by Chapter 10) (citing examples of such
activity to include working in conjunction with the Energy Commission's duties regarding energy demand and
conservation, financing the PUC's regulation of privately owned public utilities, and providing funding for
energy and fossil fuel storage).
110. Id. § 33 10(e) (enacted by Chapter 10).
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within five years of Chapter 10's enactment."'
Of course, in spite of such noble goals, the Legislature's decision to
implement Chapter 10 has not been unanimously approved."' Consequently, the
question
remains as to whether the Authority is a solution to California's energy
* 113
crisis.
B. Chapter 10: Is Public Power the Answer?
' 4
Despite Chapter 10's enactment, it nevertheless endures heavy criticism.
Opposition to the Authority comes largely from supporters of competition among
public utilities.'" Such critics of Chapter 10 feel that the establishment of a stateoperated power authority undermines the competitive intentions behind
deregulation of power companies"' and will achieve nothing in the end but raised
taxes to pay for the Authority.' 7
Considering such possible conceptual flaws, the Authority may not even
accomplish its goal of affording additional power to California at lower prices."'
Times of crisis, such as California's energy problem, can cause legislatures to
pass laws rather hastily, purely in the interest of pleasing their constituents."' The
resulting laws are typically nothing more than short-term solutions to problems
that require far-sighted strategies.2 Thus, it is yet to be determined whether
Chapter 10 will truly remedy California's power deficiency or if it is rather a

111. Id. § 3310(d) (enacted by Chapter 10).
112. See Ainsworth, supra note 101, at A3 (reporting that Republicans in the Legislature criticize the
implementation of the Authority as being socialistic and an additional unwanted governmental control of
business).
113. See Nemec, supra note 104, at VI (posing the question of whether California's financial problems
regarding the energy crisis can be solved by the imposition of a state-run public power authority and indicating
that the Authority could cause severe financial harm to the State).
114. See Gledhill & Lucas, supra note 14, at A21 (illustrating the State Republicans' view that creation
of the Authority will hinder California's ability to produce more power generators).
115. See Ainsworth, supra note 101, at A3 (describing the common Republican objection to the
Authority as contrary to capitalist ideals); see also Salladay and Gledhill, supra note 8, at A4 (presenting the
objection of Senator Bill Morrow, who stated that "[wJith the passage of [Chapter 10] .... deregulation in the
state of California is officially dead.").
116. See id. at A3 (citing Republicans' opposition to Chapter 10: that the Authority will infuse socialist
principles into California's public utility market).
117. See Mitchell Landsberg, Nicholas Riccardi, & Christine Hanley, The California Energy Crisis;
Problem Has Many Answers, None Easy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at Al (restating energy analyst Donato
Eassey's concern that, if the Authority's funds are depleted, the government may be forced to raise taxes to
compensate for the deficiency).
118. See Nemec, supra note 104, at VI (expressing doubt as to whether the Authority will solve
California's energy crisis without harming its economy).
119. See Ann-Marie White, A New Trend in Gun Control: Criminal Liabilityfor the Negligent Storage
of Firearms, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1389, 1416 (1993) (expressing the argument that legislation passed in response
to public outcry is often deficient).
120. See id. (observing that laws passed to please the public are often "piecemeal," and, as such, may
not provide long-term relief from the problems they purport to solve).
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mere reflexive action by the Legislature, enacted to pacify voters.
1. Chapter 10 and Deregulation
Many see Chapter 10 as an effective solution to the energy crisis which will
provide California with power facilities necessary to feed its hunger for
electricity. 2' Indeed, the Authority does provide a means of constructing many
new power plants in the State, 22 and it also presents the possibility of conserving
energy to alleviate the shortage.'23 Therefore, Chapter 10 appears, on its face, to
be a viable solution to California's energy problem, and it may 'provide
the State
4
with a sufficient amount of energy to meet its needs in due time. 2
However, the Authority is not universally approved throughout the State, and
opponents of Chapter 10 strongly disagree with the arguments in its favor. 5
Specifically, the Authority's critics suggest that statewide operation of power
facilities
126 is a direct contradiction of the very idea behind deregulation of electric
power. Deregulation was intended to put power sales into the hands of private
industry and foster competition among energy providers thereby decreasing
rates.2 7 Therefore, Chapter 10's opponents maintain that creating a state-operated
power authority will destroy competition. 128 Such adversaries consider this
concept of public power to be "socialist"' 29 and fear that its implementation will
achieve nothing but higher taxes for the citizens of California, who will
consequently end30up paying more money regardless of whether or not power
rates are lowered.

121. See, e.g., Salladay & Gledhill, supra note 8, at A4 (restating the argument that a public power
authority would create a source of emergency power and provide California with relief from the energy crisis).
122. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3341.1(b) (enacted by Chapter 10) (giving the Authority the power to
build new electrical facilities for the purpose of generating additional electricity for California).
123. See id. § 3365 (enacted by Chapter 10) (providing incentives for existing power generation
facilities to enact programs regarding energy and fuel conservation).
124. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ENERGY COSTS AND AVAILABILITY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB
6X, at 3 (Mar. 8, 2001) (conceding that the Authority could alleviate some of the high costs of power rates and
save the State money).
125. See Salladay & Gledhill, supra note 8, at A4 (expressing a common disdain for the concept of
public power as making one more concession to "big government").
126. See Ainsworth, supra note 101, at A3 (observing that opponents of public power argue that the
concept runs contrary to a capitalist system, thereby hindering competition).
127. See Flanigan, supra note 98, at C1 (stating that the goal of electricity deregulation is "lower rates
and better service").
128. See Salladay & Gledhill, supra note 8, at A4 (quoting Senator Bill Morrow, who feels that
implementing the Authority will decimate the idea of deregulation).
129. See Ainsworth, supra note 101, at A3 (quoting Assemblymember Dave Cox, who argues that
creating a state-operated power authority is a form of socialism and that "socialism has failed throughout the
rest of the world.").
130. See Landsberg, et al., supra note 117, at AI (expressing energy analyst Donato Eassey's argument
that public power is likely to cause the State to raise taxes in order to pay for the funds which the Authority
needs to operate).
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The opposition's arguments are not without merit. The Fund, after all, is
located in the State Treasury, 3' which is funded largely by personal income
taxes.'32 As such, all taxes not returned as refunds are transferred into the
Treasury,'33 which funds the Authority. 3 4 Therefore, regardless of whether the
Authority lowers power costs, it is ultimately California's residents who pay for
the Authority.'35
Moreover, although Chapter 10 pledges the Authority's "full faith and credit"
for all loans and bonds issued for the projects it funds,'3 6 this pledge ultimately
may not mean a great deal for California. In particular, Chapter 10 provides that
the Authority will be responsible for repaying the loans and bonds'37 but, at the
same time, it requires that such loans and bonds will only be paid from the
Fund.' So where will the money come from? If the State is not responsible for
repaying the debt' 39 and the Authority is only obligated to pay it back from the
same fund from which it issued the bonds in the first
place,' 4" it is likely that taxes
4'
will have to be raised to make-up the difference.'
Therefore, even if Chapter 10 manages to provide Californians with power at
a lower cost,' 42 the taxes required to pay for the Authority will come directly from
those living in the State.'4 3 Thus, Chapter 10 is quite likely to substitute one high
cost for a different one, and the citizens of California will have to pay for the
problem either way.'44

131. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3370(a) (enacted by Chapter 10) (creating the California Consumer
Power and Conservation Financing Authority Fund within the California State Treasury).
132. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19601 (West 1994) (providing that all personal income taxes paid
by citizens of California will be transferred to the State Treasury, pending refunds to be awarded).
133. See id. § 19603 (West 1994) (requiring that all taxes, not subject to refunds, be redeposited in the
funds of the State Treasury).
134. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3370(a) (enacted by Chapter 10).
135. See Landsberg, et al., supra note 117, at Al (observing that many have concerns that California
will not have the money to operate the Authority, and, therefore, taxpayers will have to pay the cost of its
existence).
136. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3383 (enacted by Chapter 10) (absolving the state and all other
agencies from any responsibility for repaying loans and bonds issued by the Authority).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Landsberg, et al., supra note 117, at Al (raising the concern that the Authority may not have
enough money to compensate for loans and bonds issued from the Fund, which would mean that taxes would be
raised to pay for projects authorized by the Authority). The stated purpose of this section is to "provid[e]
electricity at just and reasonable rates." Id.
142. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3310 (enacted by Chapter 10) (outlining the Authority's objectives:
build new power plants, finance conservation programs, and conduct other activities intended to alleviate
California's pressing need for additional power).
143. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19601 (West 1994) (placing revenue gained from Californians'
income taxes directly into the State Treasury).
144. See Landsberg, et al., supra note 117, at AI (addressing the risk that the Authority's lack of funds
may force California citizens to pay additional taxes to provide the revenue necessary to operate the Authority's
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2.

The "Band-Aid" Problem: Is Chapter10 Merely a Temporary Solution?

Chapter 10's opponents present legitimate objections to its enactment.' 45 The
Authority is funded by the State Treasury,146 and, therefore, it is realistic for its
critics to be concerned that the government will raise taxes to pay for it. 44 After
all, if taxes are raised to fund the Authority, the citizens of California may be
required to pay just as much for their energy requirements even if Chapter 10
succeeds in lowering power costs. 48 As a result, the overall effectiveness of
Chapter 10 is rendered noticeably suspect. 49 A conceptual flaw of this magnitude
raises an important question: if establishing the Authority is not a practical
solution to the energy crisis, why was Chapter 10 enacted at all?
The answer likely lies within the priorities of the Legislature. Simply put,
when society is presented with a crisis, a public outcry often ensues, demanding
that the government provide a solution to the problem.' 0 When faced with these
situations, legislatures sometimes respond to mounting pressure from their
constituents by hastily passing laws that seem to solve the problems at hand, with
the primary intention of appeasing the public. '' Unfortunately, the laws thus
created are often mere "Band-Aids," which ostensibly present a "quick fix" for
the problem without providing a permanent solution.'
Chapter 10 is no exception to the "Band-Aid" phenomenon. The Authority
may, in fact, succeed in building more power plants for California and thus lower
power costs by providing more energy to the State. 53 However, the fact that
54
Chapter 10's funding comes directly from taxes paid by California's citizens'
indicates a strong possibility that the State's costs will escalate, even if the

programs).
145. See supra Part IV.B.1 (concluding that Chapter 10's critics raise valid arguments that
implementation of the Authority is likely to cause the government to raise taxes in order to provide funding for
the program).
146. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3370(a) (enacted by Chapter 10).
147. Landsberg, et al., supra note 117, at Al.
148. See id. (observing that the government may be required to raise taxes in order to maintain funding
for the Authority).
149. See supra Part IV.B.1 (perceiving fundamental economic flaws in the construction of Chapter 10).
150. See Roth, supra note 102, at Al (describing "public clamor" for the government to implement a
solution to the rising problem of violent criminal activity).
151. See id. (indicating that the Houston City Council enacted anti-crime ordinances with the sole
intention of satisfying the public's desire for the government to lessen criminal activity in the city).
152. See White, supra note 119, at 1416 (criticizing laws enacted in response to public demand as
carrying the potential to become "piecemeal legislation targeted at highly visible short-term solutions with no
underlying coherency").
153. See SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 6X, at 6 (Apr. 26, 2001) (observing that
the Authority's power to construct new facilities for electricity generation may provide for lowered energy costs
and thus reduce the State's pressing need for power).
154. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 3370(a) (enacted by Chapter 10) (providing that the Authority shall
be funded by the State Treasury); see also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19603 (West 1994) (providing funding
for the State Treasury from personal income tax revenues).
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Authority manages to lower power rates.' This glaring flaw in Chapter 10's
structure indicates that it was not analyzed fully before it was enacted." 6
Therefore, Chapter 10 will likely not be a permanent solution to the energy crisis
because the additional taxes required to pay for the Authority are likely to
counteract any reduction in electricity rates that the new law may achieve.'
Thus, the Authority's propensity toward building power plants is probably a
mere temporary answer to California's power problem which will not provide a
substantial long-term solution.' As such, it is quite probable that, in enacting
Chapter 10, the Legislature sought only an immediate solution for the energy
crisis in the interest of pacifying the voters. ' " Sadly, the steps the Legislature has
taken to appease the public will probably not be enough to abate California's
pressing need for additional energy.' 6° While the provisions of Chapter 10 may
appease the public for a time, it likely cannot provide the far-reaching remedy
required to provide California with a way out of its power emergency.16'
V. CONCLUSION

It is likely that the Legislature did not consider all of Chapter 10's potential
ramifications before enacting it. 62Chapter 10 appears to be simply a "Band-Aid"
law, 163 which is likely to accomplish nothing more than higher taxes for the
State'6 as it attempts to reduce California's costs by lowering power rates
The resulting cost shifting may not provide
charged by public utilities.

155. See Landsberg, et al., supra note 117, at A I(arguing that a public power authority may require the
government to raise taxes to provide its funding).
156. See White, supra note 119, at 1416 (stating that laws passed as a result of "public opinion" will
often contain flaws due to their inherently short-sighted nature).
157. See Landsberg, et al., supra note 117, at Al (citing objections to the risk of raised taxes posed by
creating a state-operated power authority).
158. See supra Part IV.B.I (commenting that Chapter 10 may not lower California's power costs, as it is
likely to simply replace high electricity rates with a tax increase to fund the Authority).
159. See White, supra note 119, at 1416 (illustrating the inferior nature of hastily-passed legislation); see
also supra note 156 and accompanying text (demonstrating the Legislature's failure to take into account all of
Chapter 1O's possible consequences before enacting the Bill).
160. See White, supra note 119, at 1416 (discussing the fact that legislation enacted in response to the
public's demands is often insufficient to remedy the problems it addresses).
161. See Roth, supra note 102, at Al (arguing that "Band-Aid" legislation does not effectively remedy
the problems it purports to resolve).
162. See supra Part IV.B.2 (establishing Chapter 10 as a "knee-jerk" reaction to public opinion that
probably will not provide a permanent solution to the energy crisis).
163. See White, supra note 119, at 1416 (showing that legislation enacted simply to pacify the public is
not likely to solve any long-term problems); see also supra note 156 and accompanying text (demonstrating the
"quick fix" nature of Chapter 10 and its resultant inefficiency).
164. See supra Part IN.B.I (showing the probability that the government will be required to raise taxes
in order to provide funding for Chapter 10).
165. See SENATE RULES COMMITrEE, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 6X, at 5 (Apr. 26, 2001) (describing the
Authority's goal of providing the State with a sufficient energy supply at lower prices).
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California with the reduced debt it requires to increase its power supply.'6
Therefore, there is little doubt that the Legislature created the Authority under
pressure from its constituents as a short-term solution to the State's energy
Cr•

167

A "quick fix" of this nature is not what California needs to solve its energy
crisis. 6" "Band-Aid" solutions will not rectify a problem of the magnitude which
the State currently faces. 69 The Legislature's apparent concern with appearing
productive is understandable, but if California is ever going to see the end of the
energy crisis, the laws enacted to combat it need to be analyzed more thoroughly
than Chapter 10.'"0 If the Legislature does not begin to put more thought into its
proposed solutions to this problem, it will be impossible to determine how long
the energy crisis is going to last.

166. See supra Part IV.B.I (expressing the need for action against the energy crisis that provides a
solution, rather than lowering costs in one area and raising them in another).
167. See White, supra note 119, at 1416 (stating that impractical laws are often the result of legislation
passed in response to public demand).
168. Id.
169. See id. (observing that public opinion may not be an effective gauge for solving social problems
because the Legislature tends to enact laws in response to public opinion which do not provide viable solutions
to the crisis).
170. See supra Part IV.B.2 (arguing that the Legislature did not consider all of Chapter 10's potential
consequences before enacting the Bill).
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